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Abstract
Natural resource conservation concerns have been prevalent around the world, and a
range of solutions has been implemented to prevent their depletion. This paper brings
together the literature on the commons and on behavioral principles to understand how
traditional communities’ management of common pool resources can contribute to this
discussion. More specifically, it highlights how these communities can offer lessons to
governments on how to develop and manage environmental policies to ensure sustain-
able development. Whereas Ostrom’s work focuses on investigating how local com-
munities succeed at managing common pool resources without external interference,
behavior analysis can explain how cultural practices are selected. Through this com-
bined framework, we investigate the practices of an extractive reserve (RESEX) in
Brazil. A RESEX is an area of land, generally state owned, where access and use rights,
including natural resource extraction, are allocated to local groups. The RESEX Mãe
Grande de Curuçá is an example of common pool resource management that uses
governmental tools to benefit the community. Fisherfolks are able to successfully
conserve one of their main sources of livelihood: the fiddler crab. Finally, this paper
describes and behavioral interactions regarding the conservation of resources that
governments may want to consider.
Keywords Common pool resources . Traditional communities . Extractive reserve .
Cultural selection . Public policy
People are continually using the planet’s resources. Water, soil, minerals, plants, and
animals are overconsumed daily with few controls regarding the long-term impact.
However, natural resources are finite, and their conservation is crucial for the survival
of humans. All living organisms benefit from the availability of natural resources
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now—and in the future. To conserve natural resources means not to consume them
faster than they can be replaced.
Different approaches have been used to protect and restore natural resources. In
1990, Ostrom observed that control by the state or by the private market was a solution
commonly suggested to prevent the destruction of natural resources. However, Ostrom
(1990) noted that natural resources do not necessarily need to become public goods
(controlled by the government) or private goods (controlled by the market) in order to
be conserved. After carrying out field studies, she observed that communities of
individuals may be able to self-organize a productive use of a natural resource system
that succeeds in maintaining people’s behavior over long periods of time—an alterna-
tive solution to those that had been previously suggested.
Although Ostrom’s (1990) studies were focused on the practices of these commu-
nities, she did not eliminate the possibility of government and private market partici-
pation in the conservation of natural resources. Opportunely, she suggested that central
authorities could learn from local communities. Bringing together the literature on the
commons and behavioral principles can be useful to understand how local communi-
ties’ management of common pool resources (CPRs) can contribute to providing real
cases that support Ostrom’s model and the associated behavioral interpretation of it.
As a controlling agency that is able to control the behavior of a large number of
people (Skinner, 1953), the government should formulate and implement policies to
ensure the sustainable development of the planet. Through the study of cultural
practices maintained by local communities that have demonstrated how not to over-
harvest resources, we are especially interested in highlighting the lessons that can be
learned by the government in their management of environmental policies. The correct
diagnosis of variables that affect the behavior of people is useful to better inform policy
makers who design interventions to alleviate natural resource depletion.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how behavioral science and institutional
analysis can inform the design of environmental policies and help promote large-scale
social change. This analysis will address the following questions:
1. What are the behavioral processes and procedures involved in the selection of
cultural practices that can be observed in self-organized, self-governed, and long-
endurance CPR regimes, according to Ostrom’s (1990) core design principles?
2. How can the government help promote cooperative behavior and avoid economic
self-interested behavior by supporting the management of the resources by local
communities?
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section calls attention to the
background of Ostrom’s (1990) guidelines for managing CPRs. The second
section indicates extractive reserves (RESEXs) in Brazil as a possible pool of
case studies and briefly presents some cultural practices of the inhabitants of the
RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá. The third section explores Ostrom’s principles to
extract the possible behavioral processes and procedures implied, describes some
examples from the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá, and makes some policy
recommendations. The fourth section gives an overview of the behavioral princi-
ples and the cultural practices selected at the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá. The
last section presents final considerations.
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The Role of the Government in Enhancing Self-Governance in CPRs
Garret Hardin’s seminal paper titled “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968)
described the dilemma of a common resource system where self-interested behavior, or
behavior directed toward obtaining the most personal benefit, leads to the depletion of
resources, jeopardizing the maintenance of the common good for all users. The classic
example describes a pasture open to all herders to keep their cattle. To maximize their
individual gain, each herder keeps adding animals without limits, contributing to what
results in overgrazing. The tragedy of the pasture depletion takes place, and the
resource is not useful to anyone else any longer.
This situation resembles ethical self-control, as proposed by Borba, Tourinho, and
Glenn (2017). According to Borba et al. (2017), when members of a group face a
choice in a situation that offers either immediate gain for oneself or delayed gain for the
group, self-control would be characterized as choosing the delayed gain for the group.
In this sense, conditional relations must be created to ensure that the consequences for
the group are more effective than the consequences for the individual; otherwise, the
members of the group will choose the smaller and immediate individual gain, which
will culminate in the tragedy of the commons.
Based on this scenario in which people do not cooperate to produce a shared outcome
(the maintenance of the resource for future use), but rather pursue their own short-term
interest leading to a suboptimal outcome (i.e., the immediate individual gain, but the
delayed loss associated with the overuse of the resource for the entire community
gravitating around the commons), Hardin (1968) questioned the capacity of the collec-
tive management of common resources. He believed that members of a group could not
find successful solutions to collective problems (i.e., problems affecting an entire
community when the individuals emit specific behaviors) without relying on external
rules. Moreover, Hardin defended coercion as the only mechanism capable of inhibiting
the depletion of common resources. His statements had an essential role in influencing
scholars to believe that only external agents, such as the state or private markets, could
regulate the use of natural resources (Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992).
In a different direction, Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2002, 2005; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971;
Ostrom et al., 1992) dedicated her studies to researching local communities’ gover-
nance of common resources. Ostrom’s general findings, both from laboratory research
and from natural experiments, suggested that members of a group are capable of
successfully cooperating and managing shared resources without relying on external
regulations. Furthermore, she argued that imposed external rules could even crowd out
cooperative behavior.
In laboratory settings, Ostrom et al. (1992) and Ostrom (2000) observed that
cooperative behavior controlled by external rules tended to disappear very quickly.
Despite this, Ostrom (2000) also observed that cooperative behavior controlled by a
collective agreement tended to be maintained over extended periods of time. Along the
same line, field observations suggested that community members were able to develop
joint strategies and basic rules to manage resources more efficiently than when rules
were enforced by an external agent (Ostrom, 1990, 2000, 2002). Hence, these studies
opened up a new debate toward the review of the traditional thesis that stated that the
market and the government were the only two ways to manage the overuse of CPRs:
“Our findings challenge the Hobbesian conclusion that the constitution of order is only
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possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by being above subjects, by
monitoring them, and by imposing, sanctions on all who would otherwise not comply”
(Ostrom et al., 1992, p. 414).
After researching several self-organized, self-governed, and long-surviving resource
regimes, Ostrom (1990, 2005) formulated a set of eight principles characterized in CPR
systems.1 These principles referred to specific elements that accounted for the success
in promoting sustainability that were passed down through generations. Cox, Arnold,
and Tomás (2010) reviewed the design principles after analyzing 91 studies. Cox et al.
verified that the principles are well supported empirically and suggested some subdi-
visions that will be further detailed in later sections.
Nonetheless, Ostrom’s (2000, 2002, 2005; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; Ostrom et al.,
1992) work did not suggest a complete substitution of the government by community
self-governance. Instead, she pointed to the need to develop an alternative theory of
public administration that considers a variety of multiorganizational arrangements
supported by a diversity of communities of interest, as opposed to a more traditional
theory that suggests a unique top-down direction from a single bureaucratic structure.
In addition, Ostrom supported new arrangements that would provide adequate public
services to a number of different collectivities, rather than those provided by a
hierarchical authority that coordinates public services. Moreover, she advocated for a
complementary role between government and civil society in order to achieve a high
level of performance in addressing CPR management and advancing social welfare
(Ostrom, 2000, 2002, 2005; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; Ostrom et al., 1992). When
describing how to broaden the concept of policy analysis, Ostrom (2002) wrote,
National governments will remain among the targets of advice, but greater
attention should be devoted to regional and local governments. More importantly,
one of the important targets for all policy analysis in the future should be citizens
organized in diverse ways related to a multiplicity of issues. (p. 42)
Ostrom (2002) justified her appeal; public policy shall not be an exclusive domain of
any scientific discipline or area of knowledge. An optimal solution to a complex issue
needs to take its multiple facets and diversity into account. A conjoined effort creates an
arena for experimentation and provides a better means of evaluation (Ostrom, 2002). In
the next section, we describe how RESEXs in Brazil can provide elements for the study
of CPRs, both those managed by local users and those supported by the government.
The RESEXs in Brazil
In the early 1980s, the rubber tappers who inhabited the Amazon rain forest were
suffering from traders’ violence and exploitation in addition to forest felling by farmers,
1 Ostrom (1990) refers to the terms robust, fragile, or failure to characterize a CPR’s institutional performance
regarding every principle. When referring to the CPR settings described in her book Governing the Commons,
Ostrom (1990) states that “the most notable similarity of all, of course, is the sheer perseverance manifested in
these resource systems and institutions. The resource systems clearly meet the criterion of sustainability. The
institutions meet Shepsle’s (1989b) criterion of institutional robustness, in that the rules have been devised and
modified over time according to a set of collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules” (p. 89).
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which was preceded by the expulsion of the families and the appropriation of the land.
At that time, a movement began to seek the visibility of the struggles faced by the local
communities and their recognition as “the people of the forest,” with legitimate social
and agrarian rights (Almeida, 2004).
In 1985, an event was held in Brasília (the federal capital), in which different leaders
from remote Amazonian sites, including politicians, bureaucrats, technicians, profes-
sors, and students, participated. On this occasion, leaders exposed their local problems.
They were surprised at the authorities’ complete lack of planning and knowledge of the
reality of the rubber plantations. Thereafter, the leaders created the National Council of
Rubber Tappers (CNS) in an effort to organize themselves at the national level
(Almeida, 2004).
The CNS started discussing their collective claims and came up with a definition of
the RESEXs. After analyzing alternatives such as individual ownership and common
property, they understood that none of these would eliminate the risk that the land
would be sold to farmers. Only collective occupation, without the possibility of
commercialization, would aid in the avoidance of the threats of privatization of
resources. Thus, the CNS definition of RESEXs included those lands in the union that
the families would hold the perpetual right of usufruct (the right to use and take
advantage of a property short of the destruction or waste of its resources; Almeida,
2004).
Subsequently, the CNS started holding meetings with extractivists in various Am-
azonian states with the aim of strengthening the different forms of collective organiza-
tion and discussing the local problems and the proposal to transform large areas of the
forest into public areas for use according to traditional practices. Meanwhile, there was
constant back-and-forth communication with the government to achieve the goal of
creating RESEXs (Almeida, 2004). The first RESEXs in Brazil were created by
presidential decree in the 1990s, presenting a new paradigm of sustainable development
with popular participation.
A few years later, the government also recognized that marine and coastal areas
should be protected as an essential strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of
marine and coastal biodiversity. In 1992, after an effort to extend the concept of
RESEXs to these areas, the first marine RESEX was created in Brazil. The new areas
delimited territories for exclusive use by artisanal fisherfolks.
The discussion of the regulation of protected areas in Brazil lasted more than 10
years. Legal security for the new model as a state policy arose with the publication of
the National System of Conservation Units (NSCU),2 established by federal law and
regulated by decree.3 The NSCU divided protected areas into two groups: full protec-
tion and sustainable use. The aim of full protection units is to preserve natural
resources, allowing only their indirect use (i.e., scientific research, visitation for
educational purposes, and ecotourism), and saves them for special cases. The goal of
the sustainable use units is to harmonize the conservation of natural resources and their
sustainable use.
Each group includes different types of areas. A RESEX is a type of sustainable use
protected area. The law foresees that the use rights of this state-owned land are
2 The existence of a stable and legal framework to protect the initiative.
3 Federal Law No. 9985/2000 and Decree No. 4340/2002.
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allocated to a local, traditional community whose subsistence is based on extractivism,
agriculture, and raising small animals. The main objective is to protect the way of life
and the culture of the locals and to promote the sustainable use of natural resources
within that unit’s area.
The law also states that a deliberative council, composed of public bodies and
representatives from the traditional communities, will manage a RESEX. Representa-
tives from the traditional communities also compose the majority. A local management
plan, approved by the council, would describe the rules, the restrictions on use, the
actions to be developed, and the guidelines for managing resources.
The design of RESEXs presents the idea that, for purposes of environmental
conservation, the right to use land in the public domain is granted to the local
community. The government plays an active role in ensuring interactive governance
in the area, which means that they “recognize traditional uses, practices and knowledge
as instruments to ensure the present and future generations a healthy and balanced
environment” (Pinheiro, Thomas, Almeida, & Vergara, 2018, p. 4). Therefore, the local
community is directly responsible for the management of natural resources with the
support of the government.
For this reason, we believe that RESEXs in Brazil represent a pool of case studies
that can be considered in order to understand the potential role of the government in
supporting local management of natural resources. In the next subsection, we give an
overview of a marine RESEX we chose to illustrate the analysis that follows. The
information was collected through official documents, academic studies, and interviews
with locals.
RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá
To illustrate how traditional communities can inform public policy, we chose a marine
RESEX, located in the city of Curuçá in the northeast of the state of Pará in Brazil.
Curuçá is known for its diversity of species of fish and shellfish, such as shrimp and
crab. It is also widely recognized as a traditional and important fishing site in the
Amazon. Since 1997, different actors have been engaged in community mobilization to
identify and address solutions to local problems related to the overuse of their natural
resources by external agents (Souza, 2010).
In 2002, the government created the RESEXMãe Grande de Curuçá (Decree w/n from
12/13/2002) and defined its borders. The name, which was chosen by the community
itself, refers to the idea of a common origin (translated as “great mother”). The area
contains 37,062 hectares of estuary, a region where river waters interact with the ocean.4
In 2006, the government created a deliberative council with the aim of contributing
to the implementation of the RESEX’s objectives and its management plan (Federal
Ordinance No. 24/2006). The deliberative council is composed of 5 members from the
government, 2 from universities, and 20 members from civil society. The Chico
Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio)5 is the official management
4 Information gathered from http://www.icmbio.gov.br/portal/unidadesdeconservacao/biomas-brasileiros/
marinho/unidades-de-conservacao-marinho/2279-resex-mae-grande-de-curuca
5 ICMBio is a federal agency linked to the Ministry of Environment that has administrative and financial
autonomy. Its agents also exercise environmental police power over the conservation units.
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agency and the president of the council. In 2010, the government agency assigned the
right of use of the reserve to the users of the association (Associação dos Usuários da
Reserva Extrativista Mãe Grande de Curuçá) for a period of 20 years (extendable for
successive periods of 20 years). The fishing community is presided over and supported
by the deliberative council. The management plan is still being drafted; however, a
utilization plan regulates the exploitation of natural resources.
The RESEX is populated by 52 small communities located on islands, rivers, and
beaches (Souza, 2010). The traditional communities that live in the RESEX possess an
empirical knowledge about that environment, built through the historical relation of its
members with that territory. The main socioeconomic activities relate to marine
extractivism (artisanal fishing and shellfish), vegetal extraction (harvesting of forest
products), and subsistence agriculture (growing enough food crops to feed a family;
Batista & Simonian, 2013; Souza, 2010). Batista and Simonian (2013) claimed that the
traditional practices that combine these three activities, having been transmitted from
generation to generation, have historically ensured the survival of the local community.
They noted that these activities have had few significant impacts on natural resources
and that possible changes to this scenario are caused by external factors. One factor, for
example, is the presence of large enterprises related to industrial fishing that impose
predatory exploitation of natural resources around the area.
One of the most explored natural resources of the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá is
the fiddler crab. Two thousand families are completely dependent on crab fishing.
Another 3,000 families are partially dependent on crab fishing, with some reliance on
alternative sources of income.6 Aside from being one of the main sources of income for
local families, the crab has multiple uses and meanings for the local community. It
provides food security; it is the main ingredient for a variety of dishes, such as salads,
crumbs, soups, pies, risotto, pasta, snacks, and other typical specialties. The crab also
plays different roles in the local cultural traditions and is part of prayers, stories, and
dances.
The families that live on the reserve are allowed to fish. There is no schedule the
families must follow as to when they are allowed to catch crabs. Each family is
responsible for their own catch, and they are not obliged to share it with the community.
Although there is not an existing custom about sharing resources, there is a communal
agreement (a fishing partnership) between the members of the community who partner
with one another to go deep-sea fishing. The production is divided into 4.5 parts: 2
parts go to the owner of the tools, 1 part goes to each one of the two fisherfolks, and 0.5
goes to the owner of the canoe.
In addition, there is not a formal division of labor between men and women.
Nevertheless, the men are usually more involved in deep-sea fishing, and the women
prefer to catch crabs on the igarapés (small bodies of water, generally a tributary river
or a canal) when the tide is low. Most women are also involved in other activities such
as tool construction and repair, product trade, interactions between and among families,
and family care. The children in the community are taught to collect crabs by observing
and joining the adults.
There are two main threats to the conservation of fiddler crabs. The first is predatory
fishing with the widespread use of illegal fishing gear and methods. The second is the
6 Information gathered from a deliberative council representative.
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installation of shrimp farms. The shrimp farms are built on the area in the estuary where
the female crabs lay their eggs. The shrimp farms then compete with the female crabs
for space in the estuary, restricting or even resulting in the loss of the crabs’ habitat for
laying eggs.
Crab fishing is closely regulated; a ministerial order was published that prohibits
people from harvesting the crabs during specific periods of time. Other restrictions that
must be followed can be found in the utilization plan, the fishing deal between the
community and the government, and in environmental legislation (NSCU, Federal Law
No. 9.605/1998, and others).
In the next section, we use Ostrom’s (1990) work to further consider some of the
cultural practices maintained by the RESEX’s inhabitants and to identify the behavioral
processes responsible for their selection.
A Behavior-Analytic Interpretation of Ostrom’s Eight Core Design
Principles
As previously noted, Ostrom (1990, 2005) formulated eight principles based on the
observation of similar practices implemented in several self-organized, self-governed,
and, above all, long-enduring CPR regimes. For each principle, she described essential
elements or conditions that might be found in successful CPR systems. Further, Ostrom
(2000, 2005) asked for help in comprehending how some contextual variables would
enhance cooperation, whereas others would discourage it. Ostrom (2000) continued,
We need to understand how institutional, cultural, and biophysical contexts affect
the types of individuals who are recruited into and leave particular types of
collective action situations, the kind of information that is made available about
past actions, and how individuals can themselves change structural variables so as
to enhance the probabilities of norm-using types being involved and growing in
strength over time. Further developments along these lines are essential for the
development of public policies that enhance socially beneficial, cooperative
behavior based in part on social norms. (p.154)
In this regard, behavior analysis might be able to help. The focus area within behavior
analysis, cultural analysis, has led to advancements in our understanding of the
variables that promote and discourage cooperation (see Glenn et al., 2016, and
Houmanfar, Rodrigues, & Ward, 2010, for key concepts related to this analysis). In
analyzing cultural phenomena, there is a shift in the focus of attention from how a
contingency arrangement may affect the behavior of one person to how it can affect the
behavior of more than one individual that may or may not be interlocked (cf. Glenn,
2004).
Skinner’s (1953) discussion of controlling agencies, or those who have the ability to
manipulate a particular set of variables consistently and accurately to affect the
behavior of many individuals, may also be particularly useful. A controlling agency
is the part of a group that exerts ethical control over the behavior of its members.
Governments, for example, are controlling agencies that classify behaviors as
acceptable/legal or unacceptable/illegal. Governments frequently apply behavioral
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procedures such as reinforcement and punishment to control behavior. The procedures
(or controlling practices) are usually codified by issuing rules and regulations. Some-
times these rules or regulations take the form of statements that are intended to
strengthen controlling practices already operating in the group. At other times, the goal
is to promote new practices or to eliminate existing practices.
What follows is an exploratory analysis in which we propose a behavioral approach
to the study of the set of principles designed by Ostrom (1990). In this approach,
attention is shifted to the identification of possible behavioral processes and procedures
that can be extracted from each principle, interpreted from a behavior-analytic lens. The
reconstitution of the behavioral processes and procedures of the RESEX Mãe Grande
de Curuçá is used to illustrate this attempt. Following the behavioral analysis of each of
Ostrom’s principles are policy recommendations that are based on the analysis. Impor-
tantly, what we propose is not intended to reduce the potential contributions of behavior
analysis to Ostrom’s work. Rather, the analysis is meant to suggest some guidelines—
inspired by Ostrom’s core design principles and reinterpreted in behavior-analytical
terms—that may be useful for governments in order to promote the conservation of
natural resources by supporting the traditional communities that have historically
protected CPRs (i.e., did not overuse CPRs). In it, we consider how minimal interven-
tion from the government can assist traditional communities in their management of
CPRs without threats imposed by internal and external agents.
Core Design Principle 1: Clearly Defined Boundaries
Ostrom (1990) first described this principle as follows: “Individuals or households who
have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource (CPR) must be
clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself” (p. 91). Ostrom (2005)
referred to this first principle as the first step to prevent free riders (in this case, people
who benefit from the CPR without expending any effort for its protection or conser-
vation) and to organize collective action. Cox et al. (2010) proposed the following
subdivisions:
1. “Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the
common-pool resource (CPR) must be clearly defined” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3).
This statement clarifies the necessity of defining who can harvest the resources. It
draws the boundaries of who is entitled to use the natural resource and who is not
entitled to its use. Subsequently, someone will need to exclude the outsiders.
2. “The boundaries of the CPR must be well defined” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3). This
statement calls for the need to define the environment in which the rules regarding
the use of the CPR are valid. Setting geographic limits clarifies what is being
managed and highlights the need for everyone to understand the geographic
boundaries of the CPR.
From a behavioral point of view, this principle and its subdivisions seem to point out
how contingency arrangements could prevent outsiders’ access to the CPR. Social and
geographic boundaries define antecedent conditions, which signal diverse conse-
quences for different situations. For example, in a limited area, if a community member
accesses the CPR, he or she might receive approval from other community users and
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money from its sale. On the contrary, in the same area, if an outsider accesses the CPR,
he or she might receive disapproval from community users and a fine from the
authorities.
Considering that the CPR is finite, its exploitation by outsiders decreases the number
of available reinforcers for the community members. This means that the exploitation
of a CPR by outsiders can alter the cost-benefit ratio of cooperative behavior for the
community members. If there are not enough reinforcers available for everyone, it is
possible that the community members will engage in different behaviors that might be
incompatible with CPR conservation.
In this scenario, it seems that it is essential to find powerful consequences that can
control the behavior of outsiders. The outsider’s behavior of withdrawing the resources
might produce two different consequences: (a) the natural resource that could be
exchanged for money, increasing access to other reinforcers, and b) the community’s
disapproval that might involve complaints and the enforcement of formal sanctions by
the authorities. The first consequence would be expected to increase the likelihood of
the outsider’s behavior through positive reinforcement. The latter would be expected to
decrease the likelihood of the outsider’s behavior through positive punishment. In order
to suppress the behavior of the outsider, the latter consequence (b) needs to overcome
the effects of the former (a). One possible contingency arrangement might ensure that
the monetary value of the fine imposed for outsider’s use of the CPR is greater than the
monetary value of the sale of the resource withdrawn. This arrangement might prevent
the withdrawal of the resources by outsiders.
In the case of the RESEXs in Brazil, following several rounds of discussion
between government officials and the users associations’ representatives, a pres-
idential decree defined the exact limits of the protected area through geographical
coordinates, a distinction that might favor the development of stimulus control for
outsiders’ behavior regarding the areas in which special rules for withdrawing
resources are in place. In addition, the right of use was assigned to the users of the
association for a specific period of time. The association representatives are then
able to define who can withdraw the natural resources in the RESEX (i.e., who is
considered a community member). If a nonauthorized person (i.e., an outsider)
withdraws the resources, the competent agency that has environmental police
power can apply sanctions, such as fines, as defined in the law.7 Well-defined
sanctions and procedures to punish illegal behavior by outsiders might assist in
decreasing free riding.
The RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá had its geographic boundaries set by decree in
2002, and in 2010, the government assigned the control to define the social boundaries
to the association. The association has not yet defined who is entitled to harvest the
resources, which makes it difficult to effectively inhibit outsiders from withdrawing
CPRs and to punish their behavior. On two occasions, population censuses were carried
out to identify potential appropriators. The first set of census data was lost during a
governmental transition, and the deliberative council did not approve the method and
results of the second census. A new census has been approved for 2019.
Considering the lack of rigid control of the social boundaries, a member of the
deliberative council explained,
7 Federal Law No. 9605/98
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Let’s say that 90% of the inhabitants of the municipality of Curuçá usually go
fishing. For some of them, it is the main source of occupation. For others, such as
public servants, police officers, and doctors, it is a source of entertainment, a
sport, or a family tradition. None of them cause damage to the environment. The
problem is the external invasion for predatory extraction. For example, the
SEBRAE [the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service] disclosed
the potential of the oysters in the area and ended up attracting entrepreneurs who
looted the natural resources, threatening the species. (member of the deliberative
council, interviewed on February 23, 2019)
Apparently, the definition of boundaries in RESEXs involves at least two culturants (cf.
Glenn et al., 2016):
1. To define geographic boundaries (an aggregate product), government officials and
community members have to discuss and agree on the limits of the protected area
(interlocking behavioral contingencies).
2. To define social boundaries (an aggregate product), government officials need to
assign the right of selecting the potential users to the association representatives
who make a list, which may be approved by the government (interlocking behav-
ioral contingencies).
Some potential actions that policy makers could engage in to favor the successful
implementation of Core Design Principle (CDP) 1 might include (a) shortening the time
gap between defining the geographic and social boundaries; (b) ensuring community
members’ participation in the roundtable discussions to define geographic boundaries,
as both parties need to agree on the limits of the protected area; (c) offering support for
and following up on the work of association representatives in defining the potential
appropriators; and (d) ensuring that the established boundaries, especially the conse-
quences for breaking the rules, are broadly disseminated.
We suggest these actions in an attempt to help promote interlocking behavioral
contingencies to produce the aggregate products of the agreements between community
members and government officials regarding the boundaries of the protected area, the
community members, and the outsiders. Namely, these recommendations could help to
ensure the strict application of the consequences for outsiders and to promote continual
evaluation as to whether the defined consequences have successfully prevented external
threats. Once the aggregate product has been produced, it would also be important to
demonstrate how it would allow one to differentiate who is a community member from
who is an outsider and which area belongs to the RESEX and which area does not.
These aggregate products would then be antecedent conditions for reporting illegal
behaviors that should be adequately punished. The aim is to suppress inappropriate
behaviors in an effort to increase the chance of conservation of the CPR.
Core Design Principle 2: Congruence Between Appropriation and Provision Rules
Ostrom (1990) explained this principle as follows: “Appropriation rules restricting
time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions
and to provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money” (p. 92). After defining
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who is in and who is out in a set of relationships, rules would regulate the behavior of
those who can withdraw the natural resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). The objective is to
ensure that appropriators who invest in the conservation of the natural resources receive
a proportional return. Cox et al. (2010) separated this principle according to two
different conditions. The first was the conformity between appropriation rules and local
conditions. The second was the congruence between appropriation and provision rules.
Both are detailed as follows:
1. “Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource
units are related to local conditions” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3). The rules have to
specify the time, the place, the amount, and the technology used to harvest the
resources. Rules need to match local customs, livelihood strategies, and the
conditions of the CPR. This condition makes evident the importance of consulting
the local communities that have traditionally harvested the resources.
2. “The benefits obtained by users from a CPR, as determined by appropriation rules,
are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or
money, as determined by provision rules” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3). This
condition seems essential to maintain the cooperative behavior of the appropriators.
Users will only comply with the appropriation rules if the benefits from withdraw-
ing resources are proportional to the efforts required to conserve the CPR. The
users’ evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio in terms of their cooperative behavior
helps with the establishment of a fair system.
From a behavioral perspective, rules are verbal stimuli that describe contingencies of
reinforcement (Skinner, 1969). Matos (2001) noted that rules are a special type of
discriminative stimulus because they involve the behavior of the person who issues the
rule, which requires an understanding of the context in which the verbalization was
issued. CDP 2 highlights how contingency arrangements (a) install and maintain the
behavior of harvesting the CPR that produces CPR conservation and (b) ensure that
users will provide what is necessary to produce CPR conservation. CPR conservation is
a cumulative effect of repeated patterns of behavior in a macrocontingency. The first
subdivision specifies that the behavior of describing the requirements regarding the
approval or disapproval of harvesting the resources needs to be under the control of the
local conditions and the conditions of the CPR itself. From this point of view, it seems
advantageous if those who know the environment and depend on it to survive are the
ones who emit the behavior of describing the requirements in correspondence to the
analysis suggested by Matos (2001). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the govern-
ment or universities cannot support the decision-making process. These rules serve as
antecedent conditions for the behavior of harvesting the resources.
However, as demonstrated by Galizio (1979), the behavior of rule following is also
reinforced by its respective consequences. Thus, as important as it is to describe the
conditional relation involving antecedent events, behavior, and consequences
pertaining to the allowable or disallowable use of the CRP, it is also important to
ensure that the consequences that maintain rule following are also delivered. This
emphasizes the importance of the second subdivision Cox et al. (2010) offered.
The second subdivision points out the importance of verifying whether the conse-
quences (e.g., the income obtained from the CPR) effectively control the behavior of
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harvesting the resources in accordance with the predetermined conditions (appropria-
tion rules and provision rules). An evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio of following the
rules and not following the rules may be helpful. In one situation, if some requirements
are met, harvesting the resources will be reinforced. In another situation, and if the
requirements are not met, harvesting the resources might be punished (if it is not, it
might be reinforced). The more conditions there are that need to be met regarding
appropriate or inappropriate harvesting, the more conditions there are that require the
arrangement of punishment contingencies. The situation can be further restricted by
adding antecedent conditions, such as a short duration for allowable extractions, a
limited area in which harvesting can occur, or the requirement of specific topographies
of harvesting behavior such as the obligation to use a special technology or method, or
altering the parameters of the contingency by strictly specifying the amount of the CPR
allowed per person. Each additional requirement will further constrain the conditions
under which harvesting the resources is reinforced, simultaneously expanding the
conditions under which harvesting the resources can be punished.
Paralleling the consideration of rules and consequences for allowable and
disallowable extraction, it is also necessary to consider alternative behaviors that can
be emitted to obtain similar reinforcers (i.e., income). For example, in the same
situation in which harvesting the target resources can be punished, is it possible to
harvest other types of resources? The availability of alternative responses, for which
engaging in different behaviors can produce similar consequences (i.e., income), might
change the probability of harvesting the target resources when restrictions are in effect.
It is important to highlight that for both appropriation and provision rules, the
behaviors of the people who are making the rules are also under the control of
environmental events. This likely prevents insensitivity to changes—an effect that is
well documented in the instructional control literature (e.g., Galizio, 1979). Because
rules are issued in the natural context, changes in this environment result in changes to
the issued rules.
In the case of the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá, the appropriation rules are
formulated and constantly reviewed, taking into consideration the conditions of the
CPRs in a conjoined evaluation effort between the communities, the universities, and
the government. A member of the deliberative council reported,
The rules are always changing. Everything depends on the development of the
community, on nature itself, on the climate changes and other aspects. Many
studies are carried on at the RESEX by community members and members of the
universities to evaluate the conditions of the natural resources and crab fishing.
(member of the deliberative council, interviewed on February 6, 2018)
In 2018, a poster released in the community illustrated some of the appropriation rules
for that year.8 The poster explains that andada or Suatá is a specific period of the year
(from January until March) during the full moon and the new moon, during which the
male and female crabs leave their burrows and walk through the mangrove for mating
and releasing eggs. At this moment, when they are out of the burrows, they become
8 There are other appropriation rules that regulate the capture of crabs, such as the techniques that are allowed.
We decided to use these to illustrate our point regarding this principle.
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vulnerable to capture. The measure has two related objectives: to preserve the
reproduction of the species and to ensure that the number of crabs is sufficient
for the collectors who depend on the crabs’ sale for livelihood. The majority of
the production is sold to an intermediary, who is responsible for selling it to
customers, such as restaurants and others. In addition, the government support-
ed the construction of a municipal market to facilitate the commercialization of
fish and shellfish (Souza, 2010).
In Figure 1, two opposing situations can be identified. The first situation shows
when crab fishing is allowable. The second situation points out the condition under
which crab fishing is not allowed. Crab fishing can be an individual activity or a
collective activity (e.g., when community members go deep-sea fishing). The two
situations are described in Figure 2.
Community members can engage in several other activities as alternative sources of
income, especially when they are not allowed to catch crabs. Alternative behaviors
might include the collection of native fruits or nuts and fishing for other varieties of sea
creatures. This third situation is described in Figure 3.
Another example regarding the transportation of crabs illustrates the provi-
sion rules. Historically, community members have transported the collected
crabs in two different ways: pencas (the crabs are tied up together with a
string) or the crabs are placed in bags. A third method, called basquetas (the
crabs are transported in plastic boxes protected by sponges), however, has
recently been created in a partnership between fisherfolks from a close RESEX
and a government agency. When the first two methods are used, the mortality
rate of crabs ranges from 35% to 45%. When the last method is used, the
mortality rate decreases to 4.6% and the crabs survive up to 6 days.9 The local
community has incorporated the new method in their provision rules, which
suggests effective practices both in issuing rules and in following the instruc-
tions due to their accuracy. The government supported this decision by pub-
lishing a normative instruction that regulates the transportation of crabs. Grad-
uated sanctions can also be applied if basquetas are not used.
The use of basquetas can make the activity more profitable for both appropriators
(they need to collect fewer crabs to get the same amount of money) and for company
owners (they can store the crabs for a longer period). However, aside from being a
cheap technology, the materials are still more expensive than the ones used in the other
transportation methods. In order to decrease the costs of using basquetas, the govern-
ment donated the first sets of plastic boxes and sponges for the deliberative council to
distribute among the fisherfolks.
Ostrom’s (1990) CDP 2 encourages the specification of the behavioral processes and
procedures involved in the maintenance of cooperative behavior if the rules are
followed. Regarding the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá experience, an analysis of
the appropriation and provision rules allows for the description of the reinforcement
and punishment procedures that are applied to harvesting the target resources in
different contexts. It also calls attention to the importance of identifying and describing
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alternative behaviors that the appropriators can engage in to produce similar reinforcers
when harvesting the resources is not allowed.
Policy makers could engage in one or more of the following actions that favor the
successful implementation of CDP 2: (a) supporting roundtable discussions between
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Fig. 1 Campaign-advertising poster for mangrove protection in 2018. Source: ICMBio
Situation A - Permission
Situation B – Prohibition
Fig. 2 Appropriation rules: contingencies and metacontingencies for collecting crabs
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scientific research that aims to answer questions raised by the community. Both actions
are intended to establish systematic sources of information that could provide input into
decision making. It is imperative to increase the opportunities in which rule-making
behavior is influenced by changes in the environment in order to generate new and
accurate rules. Following this process, policy makers could (a) support the decision-
making process by codifying the rules created, (b) ensure that the appropriation and
provision rules are widely communicated, (c) find strategies to improve the cost-benefit
ratio of rule following, (d) offer subsidies for alternative behaviors (incompatible when
possible) or other incentives such as tools for collecting other types of resources or
seeds for plantations with the aim of increasing the probability of engaging in an
alternative behavior and decreasing the costs of cooperating, and (e) ensure that similar
consequences are available for alternative behaviors during the period(s) when the
resources cannot be harvested. For example, in these said periods, the government
could purchase agricultural products from CPR regimes and donate them to public
institutions, such as schools or long-term care facilities. The third and fourth actions
will increase the likelihood that rules will exert control over the behavior of community
members, as they increase the probability that rule-following behavior will be rein-
forced. The next principle further explores how to ensure that the rules created are
accurate and fit within the context of the natural environment.
Core Design Principle 3: Collective Choice Arrangements
Ostrom (1990) explained this principle, stating, “most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules” (p. 93). She argued
that greater community participation increases the likelihood that rules are related to the
local circumstances given the community members who directly interact with the
territory are able to adjust the rules in response to environmental changes (Ostrom,
1990, 2005). In addition, wider participation increases the possibility of taking into
account the diversity of the territory.
Cox et al. (2010) also pointed out that community participation in the elaboration of
rules is a more efficient alternative than suppressing their participation, given the
territory’s inhabitants have closer access to the CPRs and are therefore able to provide
more reliable and lower cost information. Cox et al. drew attention to the need for some
kind of control to prevent community members’ participation from being co-opted by
other internal or external actors or from being compromised by bureaucratic
procedures.
From a behavioral point of view, CDP 3 describes a possible strategy to increase the
probability that rule-making behavior is controlled by the ecological conditions of the
Fig. 3 Appropriation rules: contingencies and metacontingencies for harvesting alternative resources
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CPR. Regarding local communities’ participation in decision-making processes, we
can consider at least two scenarios. The first is implemented through a participative
model in which the community members can influence actions directly. The second is
carried out by a representative model in which community members choose someone
to represent their opinions and negotiate on their behalf. Each one implies a different
arrangement of interlocking behavioral contingencies necessary for the production of
an aggregate product, which is selected by a cultural consequence. The final aggregate
product might be the same: rules that consider the local conditions of the CPR.
Appropriators’ behavior according to rules that lead to the conservation of natural
resources will select the participatory behavior of the community members.
The participative model is characterized by a metacontingency with a large group
of people who discuss, make decisions, and create rules. Alternatively, the repre-
sentative model is characterized by a chained metacontingency in which the aggre-
gate product of the inhabitants is a list of demands that is also the antecedent
condition for the behavior of the representatives. There are advantages and disad-
vantages to both models. In the first, the participants who make the rule are the ones
who know best the conditions of the CPR. However, gathering all the community’s
members in the same place to deliberate on a certain subject can be very challeng-
ing. Besides, it can be very difficult to handle large group discussions and to ensure
broad participation. On the other hand, in the second model, it might be easier to
ensure participation with smaller groups. However, given the representatives are the
ones who discuss and negotiate in a second forum detached from the community’s
members, it might be necessary to ensure that their behaviors are guided by the
aggregate product of the behavior of the inhabitants. One possibility to increase this
control is to establish a systematic procedure of feedback and accountability for the
community with respect to the actions undertaken. The decision to adopt the
participation model must necessarily go through an analysis of what will increase
the participation of people in the particular situation in a community. In both cases,
allowing participation in decision making does not guarantee participation. The
primary concern is what consequences will control the behavior of those partici-
pating and those who are able to implement these consequences.
At RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá, the deliberative council is the official body
responsible for analyzing situations and formulating rules. As already mentioned, the
majority of the members of the deliberative council are representatives from civil
society. In this scenario, a representative model takes place. Each community has a
community committee composed of five members. These committees have the respon-
sibility to collect information, discuss, deliberate on behalf of the represented segment,
and present their demands to a polo community (i.e., a central agency that brings
together neighboring communities). The polo community compiles the demands from
the community committee and passes these on to the association that has a permanent
seat on the deliberative council.
The division into community committees and polo communities aims to organize
community member participation and ensure greater representation due to the difficulty
of adding 52 communities to the deliberative council that manages the RESEX
(Chaves, 2010). Some community committees have intense activities to collect infor-
mation from their members. Members of the deliberative council discussed the activ-
ities in these communities:
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Mr. Geraldo highlighted the importance of community meetings. Mr. Euzébio, a
fisherman from Algodoalzinho community, reported that in his community an
internal agreement was made between the community members for fishing and
agriculture. According to him, the community itself respects the laws created and
counts on the support of ICMBio. (deliberative council meeting minutes from
October 30, 2017)
Other communities still need to create a solid structure for participation that ensures
mechanisms for information exchange (Chaves, 2010).
Some actions that policy makers could engage in to favor the successful implemen-
tation of CDP 3 could include (a) supporting the community to evaluate the best
strategy model to increase participation, taking their particularities into account; (b)
promoting training in participatory processes that include content such as how to raise
priority demands and how to negotiate and create rules, if desired by the communities;
and (c) supporting the compilation of data concerning rule following and rule breaking
and ensuring a wide dissemination of the outcomes.
Core Design Principle 4: Monitoring
CDP 4 stipulates that “monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators” (Ostrom, 1990,
p. 94). Ostrom (1990) explained that in long-surviving CPR systems, monitoring and
sanctioning are undertaken by the community members and not by external authorities.
In this case, those who want to avoid opportunistic behavior also engage in observa-
tions of rule-infraction behaviors. An important aspect in implementing the monitoring
and enforcement procedures is the evaluation of the costs and benefits coming from the
adoption of those procedures. “The individual who finds a rule-infractor gains status
and prestige for being a good protector of the commons. The infractor loses status and
prestige” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 96).
Ostrom (1990, 2005) observed that some communities would manage their natural
resources in such a way that monitoring would become a by-product. This happened,
for example, when there was a schedule that rotated turns of withdrawing the resources.
In this case, the subsequent appropriator served as a natural monitor for the previous
appropriator. Cox et al. (2010) treated CDP 4 as having two subcomponents. The first
was related to the presence of monitors: “Monitors are present and actively audit CPR
conditions and appropriator behavior” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3). The second was
related to the conditions to become a monitor: “Monitors are accountable to or are the
appropriators” (Cox et al., 2010, Table 3). From a behavioral perspective, CDP 4
encompasses two important elements that inhibit noncompliance with the rules: a high
probability of detecting noncompliance and a high probability of punishing rule-
breaking behavior once it is detected. Together, these two components likely lead to
a reduction in noncompliance at a low cost.
Increasing the probability of detecting noncompliance is possible if strategies to
better observe appropriators’ behaviors when interacting with the CPR are developed.
In this sense, it is necessary to develop discrimination training that will establish
noncompliance behavior as a discriminative stimulus for the response to be punished.
Some technologies can be used in this training. One possibility would be to use
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software such as Train-to-Code (Ray & Ray, 2008), in which it is possible to insert
videos of the behaviors to be punished and effectively train (with objective measure-
ments) the identification of noncompliance behavior. Once an operant discrimination is
established, it is important to add observers or increase the duration of observations in
the locations where appropriators withdraw the resource. This could also be done by
creating conditions (or appropriation rules) to increase the simultaneous presence of
several appropriators or to sequentially withdraw the resources. This would ensure that
trained monitors/appropriators are in place for as long as possible to monitor the
behavior of others harvesting the resources.
Another possibility would be to use behavioral recording strategies such as those
described by Johnston and Pennypacker (1993) to program patrols. Community mem-
bers could be trained to select and define response classes, dimensional quantities, and
units of measurement to better observe, record, and thus report noncompliance. For
example, if it is observed that the number of crabs decreases in a given area, patrols
could be programmed to cover the surroundings. In this way, the CPR would not need
to be monitored every minute to remain protected.
Increasing the probability of punishing noncompliance depends on the monitor’s
behavior of applying the expected consequence after detecting an infraction. It is
important to understand what the consequences are that control or might control the
behavior of monitoring. Ostrom (1990) mentioned at least three potential conse-
quences: status, prestige, and conservation of natural resources. The latter justifies
why monitors are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
The objective of punishing noncompliance behavior is to supersede the individual
gains that are available from illegally harvesting the resources. Once two different
contingencies are in place (positive reinforcement and positive punishment), a parallel
can be drawn to similar procedures that have been used to investigate conditioned
suppression (Sidman, 1958). With this procedure, the first phase involves establishing a
relationship between an antecedent stimulus and a punitive event; no response is
required. In the second phase, a response is positively reinforced, which increases its
frequency. Later, in a third phase, the antecedent stimulus (that acquired aversive
properties during the first phase) is presented independently of the response that still
produces positive reinforcement. This procedure results in a decrease in the frequency
of the response in the third phase in comparison to the frequency of the response in the
second phase. In the case of the CPR, the monitors would be the antecedent stimuli and
the punitive event would involve the loss of status and prestige. As an example,
disseminating a list of people who did not comply with the rules could help to add
an aversive stimulus to the positive reinforcement.
Conditional suppression procedures would be useful only to suppress the behavior
of community members.10 In the case of outsiders, appropriators would need to be
observers who would report such behavior to the competent authorities as highlighted
in CDP 1. In both cases (community members and outsiders), one may question the
effectiveness of strategies to establish conditional suppression. The example of the
RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá exemplifies how punishment could follow different
10 The use of the term here is somewhat different from that used in experimental literature. In experimental
studies, the presentation of the aversive event is independent of the behavior that is positively reinforced.
However, in this example, punishment is contingent on the inappropriate behavior.
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levels of complexity, from immediate reprimands from the appropriator who witnesses
noncompliance behavior to punishment by external institutions. This topic will be
further explored in our discussion of CDP 5, but first it is necessary to better understand
the organizational structure as pointed out by Ostrom (1990).
At the RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá, a three-level structure has been organized to
monitor CPR withdrawal and to deal with violations. If it cannot be solved at one level,
a complaint is forwarded to the next level. First, members of the community and
members of community committees constantly monitor and audit the activities in the
RESEX. Second, the deliberative council is the authorized agency to handle formal
complaints.
Finally, ICMBio, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources (IBAMA),11 the police, the Public Ministry, and the State and Municipal
Secretary of Fishing and Aquaculture are the authorized agencies that investigate the
infractions and apply sanctions. At the first level, community members and committees
closely watch the CPR. As noted in Figure 1, the campaign-advertising poster calls on
community members to report the capture, transportation, and commercialization of
crabs during the reproductive cycle. As a general procedure, if an infraction is detected,
the community member tries to solve it by making the offender aware of the conse-
quences to the environment and asking the offender to return the crabs to their habitat.
If this is not successful, the infraction can be reported to the community committee,
who can reprimand the appropriator. If the issue is not solved informally by the local
mechanisms, then it can be forwarded to the second level. The deliberative council is
the second level. Formally, it is the agency authorized to handle complaints. If the
violation still cannot be solved at this level, then the complaint is forwarded to the third
level. In the third level, there is a set of government agencies that are allowed to
investigate the violations and apply other sanctions if necessary.
Policy makers might engage in some of the following actions to favor the successful
implementation of CDP 4: (a) verifying whether the community (appropriators or
others accountable to the appropriators) constantly monitors the areas where the CPRs
are harvested; (b) supporting the community to organize a strategy to increase the
probability of detecting infractions, if needed; (c) providing training on the identifica-
tion of noncompliance with rules; (d) examining the consequences that control (or can
potentially control) the appropriators’ monitoring behavior and supporting the commu-
nity to arrange new contingencies, if needed; (e) creating a safe and accessible channel
to report on any violations to authorized agencies; and (f) providing data on reports,
infractions, and sanctions that highlight how the behavior of monitoring contributes to
the conservation of CPRs.
Core Design Principle 5: Graduated Sanctions
Ostrom (1990) wrote, “appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense)
11 IBAMA is a federal agency linked to the Ministry of Environment, which has administrative and financial
autonomy. Its agents exercise environmental police power and are entitled to undertake actions linked to the
preservation of the environment, such as environmental quality control, licensing, and inspections that exert
environmental police power.
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by other appropriators, officials accountable to these appropriators, or both” (p. 94).
The graduated penalty system is based on the severity and the repetition of violations.
At first, it is important to remind the violator about the importance of complying with
the CPR rules. This might be enough to prevent further infractions. However, if the
same appropriator breaks the rule repeatedly, it might be necessary to escalate the
imposed sanctions to try to avoid a future infraction infringement (Ostrom 1990, 2005).
Cox et al. (2010) argued that the system must maintain proportionality between the
infraction and the sanction. A major punisher provided to a first offender might cause
more harm than it provides benefit. Consideration of the circumstances under which the
infraction happened to determine what sanction to apply could be a more effective
strategy to prevent future infractions (Ostrom, 1990, 2005).
From a behavioral perspective, the sanction system in a self-organizing, self-
governed, long-surviving CPR regime as described by Ostrom (1990) establishes a
procedure that gradually increases the intensity or varies the type of the punitive
stimulus applied to prevent reoccurrence of the behavior. It is possible to increase the
intensity of the sanction if, for example, the fines range from small to large. Repri-
mands, fines, or even banishment are different types of punitive stimuli that can be
varied with respect to intensity.
A primary feature of CDP 5 is that the type of punitive stimulus applied depends on
the severity and frequency of the behavior. The community members define what is
considered a mild or severe infraction and what is considered a mild or severe punitive
stimulus. In order to avoid possible collateral effects, mild punishments are applied to
mild or first-time infractions. If it is a severe or repeated infraction, severe punishments
are applied.
At RESEXMãe Grande de Curuçá, each of the communities has developed different
systems. In some, several steps are taken before the infractions are reported to the
deliberative council or the government authorities. In others, the monitors promptly
report incidents to the authorities and follow the inspection guidelines. In general terms,
the following sanctions are applied gradually to appropriators who break the rules: (a) a
verbal reprimand from other appropriators, (b) a written reprimand from communities’
committees and the deliberative council, and (c) administrative measures (ceasing crab
fishing, returning crabs to their habitat, and fines) from the government and judicial
investigations, as well as penalties for environmental crimes. Regarding the adminis-
trative measures, members of the deliberative council recalled that government officials
also need to contribute to the conservation of the CPR:
Mr. Patrick from ICMBio . . . highlighted the role of ICMBio and IBAMA in
monitoring the reproductive cycle of the Caranguejo-Uçá and the role of the
[deliberative] council . . . to raise public awareness by communicating the legal
basis, the periods of closure, the penalties, the definition, and importance of
Suatá. [Regarding the conservation of resources], Ms. Amanda from Boa Vista
community of Iririteua calls attention to the fact that there is an effort [from the
community] to collaborate with the period of closure, but not the same effort to
release the seized crabs by the authorized government agency. Mr. Marcelo from
CONFREM [the Commission for the Strengthening of Marine Extractive Re-
serves] says that he has already looked for places to adequately release the crabs
with the local population . . . Mr. Junior from Colonia de Pescadores mentioned
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that in previous years’ seizures, IBAMA did not release the crabs immediately
and released into an unsuitable area, what led to the death of a lot of crabs.
Some actions policy makers could take to favor the successful implementation of CDP
5 might include (a) supporting the community to maintain a historical registry of the
infractions, (b) funding research to evaluate the effectiveness of applied sanctions in
suppressing the inappropriate behavior, and (c) ensuring that administrative sanctions
applied by the government are also controlled by the conservation of the CPR.
Core Design Principle 6: Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
Ostrom (1990) concluded that in self-organized, self-governed, and long-enduring CPR
systems, “appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials” (p. 100).
Ostrom (1990) also argued that a rule might have multiple interpretations. Someone could
use this as an opportunity to subvert the rule. Others might think that they are complying
with the rule and, therefore, are making an honest mistake. To prevent these situations
from happening, there must be easy access to arenas in which locals can discuss joint
strategies and resolve conflicts about what constitutes an infraction (Ostrom 1990, 2005).
From a behavioral point of view, the existence of local arenas (the antecedent
condition) allows appropriators’ interactions (interlocking behavioral contingencies)
to produce fast and low-cost common agreements (aggregate products). With the
possibility of frequently reviewing, changing, or detailing the rules, it is likely that
the rules are often under the control of the constant changes in local conditions and
livelihood strategies (as mentioned before when discussing CDPs 2 and 3). The rules,
as contingency arrangements, help to promote and maintain the behavior of checking
the conditions of the CPR and discussing them with other appropriators. The aggregate
product of this discussion should be an agreement as to how to manage the CPR. In
turn, the common agreements are also antecedent conditions for the behavior of
harvesting the resources in the future.
At RESEX Mãe Grande de Curuçá, local issues are discussed at the communities’
committees. These committees were created to facilitate the comanagement of the
RESEX. They receive information and try to solve conflicts. The following discussion
exemplifies the process:
Colônia’s president [a civil society representative] reported major problems
regarding the use of prohibited fishing gear . . . RESEX Cuinarana’s environ-
mental analyst [a government representative] reported on the conservation unit’s
experience on spreading the word about the fishing rules and on the need for
discussion and change [of the rules] through grassroots community meetings.
(deliberative council meeting minutes from October 30, 2017)
If an issue requires deeper analysis and discussions that involve other communities
from the RESEX, it is referred to the deliberative council.
Policy makers might (a) support the communities to increase the availability of
effective local conflict resolution and (b) support training on conflict mediation, if
needed, to favor the successful implementation of CDP 6.
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Core Design Principle 7: Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize
Ostrom (1990) noted in CDP 7 that “the rights of appropriators to devise their own
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities” (p. 101). Minimal
recognition of the legitimacy of managing the CPR allows the appropriator to apply the
rules without external intervention. If external agents believe that they have the right to
set different rules without consulting local communities, it might be difficult for the
appropriators to uphold their traditions (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990, 2005). If CDP
7 is not followed, an appropriator might challenge a rule before an external agent. In
this situation, a different reasoning in the case or a different understanding of the facts
or of the relevant precedents can defy the rules created by the community and threaten
the conservation of the CPR. Appropriators need reassurance that no external agent will
question the rules they have created.
From a behavioral perspective, CDP 7 suggests that the contingencies described in
the rules created and managed by the community must be the only contingencies
operating for the behavior of withdrawing the resource. No external agency should
be able to implement any other contingencies. For example, in the case of an appro-
priator being punished after breaking a rule, no escape contingency should be available
through regulations imposed by external agencies—that is to say, no external agent
should be able to remove the consequences designed by the community.
Previously we described how the government assigns the right of use to the local
users in the cases of the RESEXs in Brazil. A deliberative council composed of
different actors creates these rules. Although the local communities are the majority,
the government and other external actors also participate and support all decisions.
However, no action will be taken without the local communities’ approval.
Policy makers could favor the successful implementation of CDP 7 by engaging in
the following actions: (a) engaging in prior consultation in all cases where there is an
intention to provide official support and (b) analyzing the rules and procedures applied
by the community and avoiding the implementation of opposing or conflicting rules.
Core Design Principle 8: Nested Enterprises (Used in Large, More Complex Cases)
Ostrom (1990) referred to the existence of more than one level of interaction in more
complex CPR regimes. She explained that in successful long-enduring CPR systems,
“appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and gover-
nance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom, 1990,
p. 101). Cox et al. (2010) clarified that the interactions might occur between different
groups of appropriators or between appropriators and government officials at different
levels.
From a behavioral point of view, CDP 8 refers to the interlocking behavioral
contingencies either between appropriators at the same or different levels or between
appropriators and government officials that produce specific aggregate products. The
aggregate products are, then, selected by a cultural consequence.
Considering the RESEX, several examples of interactions have been reported—for
instance, interactions between appropriators, community committees, and the deliber-
ative council or between community representatives and government officials. This
design is particularly interesting given other actors who also work in the territory also
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play crucial roles. Federal, state, and municipal governments are competent to promote
public policies directed at the local population. Universities promote education, re-
search, and community services. Sharing decisions makes it possible to provide
integrated policies that favor the population and conservation of the CPR.
Additionally, besides other municipal- and state-level interactions, it is relevant to
mention two additional national forums in which appropriators from different RESEXs
are represented. The first is CONFREM. CONFREM is a national-level entity that
represents the interest of more than 100,000 families living in marine and coastal
RESEXs in 18 states of Brazil. Their mission is to help implement strategies that
recognize the social, cultural, environmental, and economic dimensions of traditional
livelihoods of the marine and coastal RESEXs. The second is the National Council of
Traditional People and Communities. It is a collegiate body of an advisory nature,
composed of government officials and civil society representatives from 27 different
traditional groups, such as indigenous people, quilombolas communities, gypsies,
extractivists, and others. The council is entitled to promote the sustainable development
of traditional people and communities in order to recognize, strengthen, and ensure
their rights (Decree 8750/2016). The existence of these two forums guarantees that
minimal federal guidelines common to all RESEXs take into account traditional
communities’ experience and the conditions of the CPRs.
Policy makers could take action to ensure local community participation at every
level of the decision-making process to favor the successful implementation of CDP 8.
After reviewing all the CDPs, three types of behavior seem to be crucial for the
emergence of successful CPR systems that are able to conserve their natural resources
over the long term: (a) rule making and rule following, (b) face-to-face control, and (c)
participatory behavior in decision making. Instead of waiting for these behaviors to
emerge, it is possible to influence their selection. In a given situation, behavior analysis
can describe the existing competing contingencies that prevent the selection of these
behaviors, and identify possible variables that can influence the probability of their
occurrence or potential strategies to reduce the cost of their emission. The government
might be able to partner with the communities to manipulate these variables and to
implement strategies that can support the selection of these behaviors and achieve
sustainability at a low cost.
Looking at the Big Picture
The behavioral processes and procedures extracted from each principle are part of a
complex arrangement of historically selected cultural practices of self-organizing, self-
governed, and long-surviving CPR regimes. Although they are treated separately for
analysis, it is essential that the principles be understood as interrelated. The fragility of
one CDP completely changes the configuration of the relationships. For example, if there is
a graduated sanction system (robust principle 5) but no monitor to observe the behavior
(fragile principle 4), it is unlikely that a rule violator will be punished. Or if the appropriation
rules are related to the local conditions (robust principle 4a), but there is no definition of who
is allowed to harvest the resources (fragile principle 1), it seems difficult to apply these rules.
Thus, the analysis of a CPR’s institutional performance as related to every principle is
essential in understanding the success of community-based natural resource management.
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From a behavioral point of view regarding these principles, one could argue that the
CDPs could be grouped in terms of the behavioral controls exerted. For example, CDPs
2, 3, and 7 would involve rule making; CDPs 4, 5, and 7 would involve punishment for
not following rules. However, the purpose of this analysis is to emphasize how
knowledge of behavior analysis can contribute to Ostrom’s (1990) proposal. Thus,
we considered it important to maintain the original proposal and to indicate the
behavioral procedures and processes that can assist policy makers in managing CPRs.
Through the study of the local practices of the RESEXMãe Grande de Curuçá, three
situations were observed. Each situation is characterized by repeated patterns of
individual contingencies and their effects or interlocking behavioral contingencies
and their aggregate products, which are selected by a consequence or cultural conse-
quence or are punished. The situations are displayed in Figure 4.
When looking at the big picture, a macrocontingency can be identified through the
observation of repeated patterns of behaviors from appropriators harvesting the re-
sources in the RESEX area (CDP 1, boundaries). Three situations were verified.
Situations A and B refer to different contingency arrangements devised by
appropriators (CDP 3, collective choice arrangements, and CDP 6, conflict-resolution
mechanisms) and supported by the government (CDP 7, rights to organize). Situation A
refers to the conditions under which collecting crabs is reinforced by the money from
their sale (CDP 2, appropriation and provision rules). Situation B indicates the condi-
tions under which collecting crabs is punished according to a graduated sanction
system (CDP 4, monitoring, and CDP 5, graduated sanctions). Situation C represents
alternative behaviors that can be similarly reinforced.
Only the existence of the three situations can generate the cumulative effect, which
is the conservation of the CPR with renewed resources. The outcomes of this config-
uration are constantly monitored and evaluated. The data collected reflect the local
Fig. 4 CPR macrocontingency. Source: Reserva Mãe Grande de Curuçá (background), adapted from Google
Maps
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conditions and inform the deliberative council who can reevaluate the appropriation
and provision rules and the graduated sanctions.
Another possible interpretation might consider the choice situation that involves the
magnitude and the delay of the consequence. When looking at the big picture, it is
possible to observe two metacontingencies. The quantity of crabs is the aggregate
product that can be exchanged for money. In the first metacontingency, the frequency of
the culturant is increased by larger rewards in the short term; however, it would lead to
the depletion of the CPR, impeding future use. In the latter metacontingency, the
frequency of the culturant is increased by smaller rewards that could be collected
multiple times over the long term, including time-out periods, leading to the conserva-
tion of the CPR.
This situation involving competing metacontingencies is similar to the one Baia and
Vasconcelos (2015) reported in which two concurrent metacontingencies were pro-
grammed. The first would produce immediate positive consequences without a time-
out. The second would produce greater consequences with multiple periods of time-out.
Their findings showed that the metacontingency that would provide greater conse-
quences in the long run was the one that the participants engaged in most.
This analysis is not aimed at determining whether the RESEX Mãe Grande de
Curuçá is a robust or a fragile CPR system. The intention is to offer additional elements
that governments might want to consider when formulating, implementing, and eval-
uating environmental policies. The current study focused on the analysis of cultural
practices of a community as a whole and how contingencies might affect the behavior
of people at a larger scale. For this reason, the emphasis was placed on concepts that
have been developed more recently to help understand the behavior of persons in
groups, such as metacontingencies, macrocontingencies, interlocking behavioral con-
tingencies, and so on. However, some concepts less commonly used to explain the
behavior of people who are not necessarily in interaction with others were also used to
broaden the scope of this analysis.
Further Reflections
In this paper, we sought to highlight the governmental role in supporting traditional
communities to conserve natural resources. We illustrated that understanding how
communities perceive and comprehend their surroundings and engage with community
members is essential to designing adequate interventions. By enhancing the self-
governance of local communities, the government might be able to allocate resources
efficiently and strategically toward sustainable development.
To support government agencies in this task, the integration between an institutional
analysis and a selectionist approach is especially useful. Such an approach can dem-
onstrate how the relationship between people’s behavior and their environment (in a
behavior-analytic meaning) should be a reference for environmental policies. Whereas
an institutional analysis can describe common characteristics of successful CPR re-
gimes and the cultural practices of their inhabitants, behavior analysis can describe how
these practices were selected and evolved. This combination raises the possibility of
guiding interventions that can help the emergence of essential cultural practices,
especially in CPR systems that fail in conserving their resources.
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Guided by essential principles, systematized according to an institutional analysis,
behavior analysts can study CPR regimes as natural experiments and reconstitute the
processes of selection and evolution of existing cultural practices. By doing so, it is
possible to identify which variables control the behavior of the community members
and other variables that can likely affect it. This analysis can inform the community
members and their associations, as well as the government, about variables that can be
manipulated to help desired practices emerge.
Additionally, behavior analysts can support local communities and governments in
testing different hypotheses, manipulating variables, and measuring their effect on the
behavior of appropriators. Previous findings from basic and applied research on
different areas such as discriminative control, choice and preference, reinforcement
history and punishment, for example, might offer suggestions about different contin-
gency arrangements that could be tested to improve rule following, participatory
behavior, and face-to-face control. Findings from documentary research, quasi-
experimental studies, and experimental research can spread beyond individual func-
tional units and help in promoting large-scale social change toward the conservation of
natural resources.
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